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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
JOHN OLCOTT and BETTY OLCOTT, 
dba JB'S PEPPER TREE MARKET, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Appellate Court No, 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to § 78-2a-3 U.C.A. (as amended 1953). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Did the trial court err in ruling that Defendants owe 
Plaintiff $2,315.39 on an insurance application (policy) when 
Plaintiff's summary judgment motion requested judgment for a 
different amount on a different insurance policy? Standard of 
Review: In considering an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, 
the appellate court views the facts in a light most favorable to 
the losing party below. Winecrar v. Froerer Corp. , 813 P.2d 104 
(Utah 1991). And in determining whether those facts require, as a 
matter of law, the entry of judgment for the prevailing party 
below, the appellate court gives no deference to the trial court's 
conclusions of law, which are reviewed for correctness. Blue Cross 
& Blue Shield v. State. 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989); Schurtz v. BMW of 
N.Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991). 
B. Did the trial err in ruling that Defendants owe plaintiff 
the amount of $2,315.39, and signing an Order that states that 
Defendants owe Plaintiff the amount of $394.21? Standard of 
Review: In considering an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, 
the appellate court views the facts in a light most favorable to 
the losing party below. Wineaar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 
(Utah 1991). And in determining whether those facts require, as a 
matter of law, the entry of judgment for the prevailing party 
below, the appellate court gives no deference to the trial court's 
conclusions of law, which are reviewed for correctness. Blue Cross 
& Blue Shield v. State. 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989); Schurtz v. BMW of 
N.Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991). 
C. Did the trial court err in finding Defendants owed 
anything to Plaintiff where the evidence clearly showed that 
Defendants had paid Plaintiff on the first application, and had 
neither signed the second application nor had knowledge of it? 
Standard of Review: In considering an appeal from a grant of 
summary judgment, the appellate court views the facts in a light 
most favorable to the losing party below. Wineaar v. Froerer 
Corp. . 813 P. 2d 104 (Utah 1991). And in determining whether those 
facts require, as a matter of law, the entry of judgment for the 
prevailing party below, the appellate court gives no deference to 
the trial court's conclusions of law, which are reviewed for 
correctness. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P. 2d 634 (Utah 
1989); Schurtz v. BMW of N.Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991). 
D. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment 
based on the first insurance policy which was not pled in 
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Plaintiff's complaint? Standard of review: In considering an 
appeal from a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court views 
the facts in a light most favorable to the losing party below. 
Wineaar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P. 2d 104 (Utah 1991). In determining 
whether those facts require, as a matter of law, the entry of 
judgment for the prevailing party below, the appellate court gives 
no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law, which are 
reviewed for correctness. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 
P.2d 634 (Utah 1989); Schurtz v. BMW of N.Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 
(Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Defendants are unaware of any determinative constitutional 
provisions, statutes or rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case. This is a civil case involving two 
insurance policies—one on which Plaintiff based its complaint, and 
one on which Plaintiff based its summary judgment motion. 
B. Course Of Proceeding And Disposition Below. 
Plaintiff filed a complaint in this case on February 12, 1986, 
and prayed for judgment in the amount of $2,315.39, an amount 
Plaintiff alleged was due on insurance premiums (R. at 5) . On 
March 13, 1989, Defendants moved to have the case transferred from 
the Fourth Circuit to the Fourth District Court. (R. at 164) . On 
or about July 27, 1990, the court amended the pleading to name 
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Truck Insurance Exchange as Plaintiff, rather than Farmer's 
Insurance Group. (R. at 211). Plaintiff filed its first summary 
judgment motion on January 3, 1991, requesting judgment based on 
the insurance policy at issue in its complaint. (R. at 221, 225) . 
On September 9, 1991, Plaintiff's first Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment were 
denied. (R. at 357). 
On December 11, 1991, Plaintiff filed a second Motion for 
Summary Judgment against Defendants, requesting relief based on an 
insurance application different than the one on which plaintiff 
based its complaint. (R. at 382) . On May 18, 1992, this case was 
transferred back to the Fourth Circuit Court. (R. at 490). On 
January 11, 1993, the Circuit Court issued a ruling granting 
Plaintiff's second Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 512). 
Defendants filed a Motion for New Trial on January 20, 1993, based 
on Rule 59(a) (6) (insufficiency of evidence). (R. at 514-519. The 
order is at 544). 
On February 19, 1993, the Circuit Court issued a ruling 
denying Defendants' Motion for New Trial. (R. at 541). Plaintiff 
attempted to submit a Summary Judgment Order which differed in 
significant aspects from the ruling the trial court issued. The 
most important aspect being that the ruling held Defendants liable 
for $2,315.39, while the submitted Order contained the figure $394. 
Due to the discrepancies, Defendants filed a Notice of Objection to 
Summary Judgment on March 5, 1993. (R at 551). The trial court, in 
an April 1, 1993 memorandum, affirmed its summary judgment and 
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denial of new trial rulings. (R at 556) The Summary Judgment 
Order was signed on March 25, 1993. (R. at 548). Defendants filed 
a Notice of Appeal on April 8, 1993. (R. at 561). 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. On or about November 30, 1984, Olcotts filed an 
application for insurance coverage with Truck Insurance Exchange 
(TIE) , one of several companies within Farmers Insurance Group, to 
cover their business operations. (R. at 244). 
2. On or about November 30, 1984, the Olcotts executed 
an application and agreement with Prematic Service Corporation, 
(hereafter "Prematic"), to finance the estimated annual premium for 
the insurance coverage applied for through monthly budget payments. 
(R. at 218). 
3. Pursuant to their application, the Olcotts issued a 
check to TIE on the above date in the amount of $369.59, the 
equivalent of two (2) months of the estimated premium (plus $3.59 
service charge), pursuant to the agreement with Prematic. (R. at 
249) . 
4. On or about January 7, 1985, the Olcotts issued a 
second check to TIE in the amount of $183.00, the equivalent of the 
third month's premium pursuant to the agreement with Prematic, 
which brought the total premiums paid to $552.59. (R. at 249). 
5. On or about January 22, 1985, TIE notified the 
Olcotts that they were ineligible for the insurance for which they 
had applied and that the insurance under that policy would only 
continue until February 6, 1985. (R. at 255). 
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6. The final paragraph of the Prematic application and 
agreement states that the application is presumed accepted if no 
notice as to acceptance or otherwise is received within thirty (30) 
days from the date signed. (R. at 248). 
7. The application was signed November 30, 1984 and the 
notice of cancellation was given January 22, 1985, fifty-two (52) 
days after the application was signed. (R. at 255 ). 
8. Because the Olcotts were told that the insurance 
policy (which was a preferred policy) would be canceled after 
February 6, 1985, they procured insurance coverage elsewhere (as 
advised to do in the cancellation document). (R. at 255 and 274). 
9. Meanwhile, a second application for an insurance 
policy with standard premiums was filled out and submitted.. (R. 
at 251) • 
10. The Olcotts were completely unaware of this second 
application and did not sign it. (R. at 290. See also exhibits R 
at 282-290). 
11. Plaintiff subsequently made demand upon the Olcotts 
for payment of premiums under the second policy with the standard 
rates. (R. at 258). 
12. The Olcotts, being unaware of this second 
application for insurance, refused to pay the premiums, as they had 
purchased insurance elsewhere. (R. at 274). 
13. Plaintiff brought suit under the second application, 
demanding that Olcotts pay $2,315.39 to plaintiff. (R. at 5). 
14. On or about January 9, 1991, plaintiff filed a 
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motion for summary judgment asking for the $2,315.39 plaintiff 
contended was owed under the second policy (which Defendants had 
not signed), as alleged in plaintiff's complaint. (R. at 221, 
225) . 
15. Plaintiff was denied recovery of the $2,315.39. (R„ 
at 352). 
16. Subsequently, plaintiff filed a second motion for 
summary judgment asking for the amount of $367.21, the alleged 
difference between the quoted preferred rate on the first 
application for the 69 days of coverage it provided and the rate on 
file with the State Insurance Division. (R. at 382, 385). 
17. The trial court, in ruling on plaintiff's second 
motion for summary judgment, ordered that the Olcotts are to pay 
plaintiff the amount of $2,315.39, an amount which plaintiff had 
asked for and was denied in its first motion for summary judgment, 
but had not asked for in the motion which was then before the 
court. (R. at 512, 513). 
18. More specifically, the trial court found: 
One: Defendants entered into a commercial 
coverage insurance policy with plaintiffs, which 
policies are reviewed by their underwriting 
department for applicability to the risk and the 
rate which is not determined up front as an auto or 
homeowners policy would be due to the nature of the 
risk and its need for underwriting analysis. 
Two: Defendants were notified by plaintiffs' 
underwriting department that the risk could not be 
written in the particular subsidiary company at the 
rate indicated at the time of binding, but that the 
risk could be written in a higher risk company at 
that rate. 
Three: Defendant were covered by the plaintiff 
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insurer during this period of communication and a 
premium was earned by plaintiff. 
Four: Defendants obtained insurance coverage 
from another insurance carrier at a rate more 
satisfactory to them. 
Five: The plaintiff is now seeking the unpaid 
portion of the insurance premium that they [sic] 
claim is owed. In doing so they have billed at the 
lower rate of the first, lower risk company. That 
amount is $2,315.39, and appears uncontested as to 
the amount, but contested as to whether or not is 
it [sic] owed. This is the subject matter of this 
suit and motion for summary judgment. 
(R. at 512, 513). 
19. Defendants filed a Motion for New Trial, but the 
motion was denied. (R. at 514. 519). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendants owe nothing under the first insurance policy 
because it is not at issue in this case. Additionally, defendants 
owe nothing under the first insurance policy because they paid the 
premiums in full for the period for which they were covered. 
Plaintiff is bound by the premium quoted by plaintiffs insurance 
agent, Mr. Ken England, because Mr. England was acting as 
plaintiff's agent. Additionally, plaintiff is bound by the 
prematic application and agreement. 
Defendants owe nothing under the second insurance policy 
because it was executed by someone other than defendants without 
defendants7 authority. Defendants had no knowledge of the 
existence of the second insurance policy until nearly six (6) years 
after it was allegedly executed. 
The lower court's ruling on the summary judgment motion 
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at issue here clearly indicates that court's lack of understanding 
of the issues of this case in general, and specifically the issues 
contained in the summary judgment motion before the court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEPENDANTS OWE NOTHING UNDER THE FIRST INSURANCE POLICY. 
A. DEFENDANTS OWE NOTHING UNDER THE FIRST INSURANCE POLICY 
BECAUSE IT IS NOT AT ISSUE IN THIS CASE. 
Plaintiff's complaint was brought against Defendants based on 
the second insurance application—the one Defendants neither had 
knowledge of nor signed. Plaintiff's complaint prayed for 
$2,315.39, the amount Plaintiff claims is owed on the second 
policy. Plaintiff's complaint also alleges that the policy was 
cancelled because of non-payment of premiums. 
While it may not be clear from a reading of the complaint that 
it is in fact the second policy application Plaintiff brought suit 
on, a cursory examination of Plaintiff's summary judgment motions 
clarifies this issue. 
Plaintiff's first summary judgment motion, filed January 3, 
1991, asked for judgment based on the second insurance application, 
referenced in Plaintiff's Complaint. As stated by Plaintiff in 
it's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at 7 (R. at 231): 
"TIE contends that the insurance coverage for which an earned 
premium is due is related to Application No. 2, received by TIE at 
its Pocatello Regional Office on or about January 18, 1985, . . ." 
That summary judgment motion was denied. 
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Plaintiff's second summary judgment motion (the basis of this 
appeal), filed on December 11, 1991, asked for judgment based on 
the first insurance application, which was not the basis of 
Plaintiff's complaint. As stated in Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Support of Summary Judgment: "On or about December 5, 1984, TIE 
received at its Pocatello Regional Office Olcott's application for 
insurance coverage dated November 30, 1984, (the "Application") 
executed by the Defendant John Olcott." The insurance policy at 
issue in the second summary judgment motion was cancelled due to 
Defendants' ineligibility, not due to non-payment of premiums (as 
alleged in Plaintiff's complaint). Plaintiff's second summary 
judgment motion asked for $367.21, the difference between the rate 
given Defendants under the preferred policy and the rate Plaintiff 
claimed it was required to pay according to the State schedule. 
Plaintiff is clearly referring to two different policies in 
its two motions for summary judgment: the first motion asked for 
relief based on the second policy (referenced in the complaint), 
and the second motion asked for relief on the first policy which 
Defendants actually had knowledge of and signed. 
In summary, Plaintiff based its Complaint and first summary 
judgment motion on the second insurance policy. The summary 
judgment at issue here was based on the first insurance policy on 
which Plaintiff has never brought a cause of action. Plaintiff has 
never requested payment of the $367.21 it alleges is due on that 
policy. Rule 56(a) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, 
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. . . move . . . for a summary judgment in his favor upon 
all or any part thereof. 
The basis for Plaintiff's summary judgment motion at issues 
here cannot be found in any "claim, counterclaim or cross-claim" or 
"declaratory judgment" as it was never pled. Therefore, summary 
judgment based on the first insurance policy was clearly erroneous. 
B. DEPENDANTS OWE NOTHING UNDER THE FIRST INSURANCE POLICY 
BECAUSE THEY PAID THE PREMIUMS IN PULL FOR THE PERIOD FOR 
WHICH THEY WERE COVERED. 
At the time Defendants executed the application for insurance, 
Plaintiff's insurance agent, Mr. Ken England, provided Defendants 
with an estimate of what the insurance would cost Defendants. This 
estimate was $2,140.00 per year, which worked out to be a total 
payment of $183.00 per month. (R at 244) 
Defendants entered into an agreement, through Mr. England, 
with Prematic Services Corporation to finance the insurance 
premiums to Plaintiff. The final paragraph of the Prematic 
application and agreement states that the application is presumed 
accepted if no notice of cancellation is received by Defendants 
within thirty (30) days from the date signed. The application was 
signed November 30, 1984 and the Notice of Cancellation was given 
January 22, 1985, fifty-two (52) days after the application was 
signed. Since more than thirty (30) days had passed before 
rejection was received, Plaintiff is bound by the figure used in 
the application. 
Furthermore, if Plaintiff was owed more money on the cancelled 
first policy, it certainly would (or should) have indicated such on 
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the Notice of Cancellation it sent to Defendants, which Defendants 
received on or about January 22, 1985. (R at 255, 256). There is 
no mention on the Notice of Cancellation document of any monies due 
on the cancelled policy. It is unreasonable, for Plaintiff to 
claim, after six (6) years and much litigation, that Defendants owe 
more money on a policy that was cancelled by Plaintiff years 
before. 
Even if TIE were allowed to adjust the estimate given by its 
agent, allowing TIE to do so six years after the fact is 
unreasonable, against public policy, and violates the doctrine of 
laches. See Anaelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah. 671 P.2d 772 
(Utah 1983) See also Morgan v. Board of State Landsf 549 P.2d 695 
(Utah 1976) J.P. Koch. Inc. v. J.C. Penney Company. Inc.. 534 P.2d 
903 (Utah 1975); Leaver v. Grose. 610 P.2d 1262 (Utah 1980). TIE 
received the premium payments in December of 1984 and January of 
1985. If TIE were going to adjust the rates and comply with State 
law, as it contends it must, it should have done so at that time. 
Instead, TIE waited until it was faced with the threat of a 
malicious prosecution suit to attempt to exercise it's "right" to 
adjust the estimate given six (6) years prior. 
Plaintiff has not properly brought a claim for the money it 
alleges is owed on the first insurance policy—it has merely tried 
to sneak in the back door via its summary judgment motion to 
attempt to avoid a malicious prosecution suit by Defendants. 
Additionally, Defendants paid three (3) months (or ninety (90) 
days) premiums on the policy before it was cancelled, but only 
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actually received approximately sixty-nine (69) days of coverage 
under the policy. Therefore, not only have Defendants paid the 
premiums in full on that policy, but Defendants are due a partial 
refund for the period for which they paid but were not covered 
under the first policy. 
1. PLAINTIFF IS BOUND BY THE PREMIUM QUOTED BY 
PLAINTIFF'S INSURANCE AGENT, KEN ENGLAND, BECAUSE 
MR. ENGLAND WAS ACTING AS PLAINTIFF'S AGENT. 
Mr. Ken England, in executing the documents surrounding the 
procurement of insurance for Defendants, was obviously acting in 
the capacity of Plaintiff's agent. An agency relationship may be 
created where actual authority has been conferred to the agent to 
act on behalf of the principal. This authority may be express or 
implied. 
Express authority exists whenever the principal directly 
states that its agent has the authority to perform a 
particular act on the principal's behalf. 
Zions First National Bank v. Clark Clinic Corporation, 762 P.2d 
1090, 1094 (Utah 1988). 
In addition to express authority, agency may also be created 
by implied authority. In order to establish agency by implied 
authority, there must be conduct on the part of the principal that 
indicates his intention to confer authority, or otherwise cause the 
agent to believe that he possesses authority, to act on behalf of 
the principal. Rest. 2d §26. The Utah Supreme Court has stated, 
Implied authority, . . ., embraces authority to do those 
acts which are incidental to, or are necessary, usual, 
and proper to accomplish or perform, the main authority 
expressly delegated to the agent. Implied authority is 
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actual authority based upon the premise that whenever the 
performance of certain business is confided to an agent, 
such authority carries with it by implication authority 
to do collateral acts which are the natural and ordinary 
incidents of the main act or business authorized. This 
authority may be implied from the words and conduct of 
the parties and the facts and circumstances attending the 
transaction. 
Id. at 1094-95. See Bowen v. Olsen. 576 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1978). 
Furthermore, Plaintiff also ratified Mr. England/s acts. In 
Zions First National Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090 
(Utah 1988), the Supreme Court discusses ratification. It held: 
A principal may impliedly or expressly ratify an 
agreement made by an unauthorized agent. Ratification of 
an agent's acts relates back to the time the unauthorized 
act occurred and is sufficient to create the relationship 
of principal and agent. A deliberate and valid 
ratification with full knowledge of all the material 
facts is binding and cannot afterward be revoked and 
recalled. 
Clark at 1098. The Court also held: 
When a principal claims the benefits of a contract made 
by his agent, he cannot repudiate the acts of this agent 
on the ground such acts were unauthorized. Accepting a 
contract and claiming the fruits thereof, the principal 
takes with whatever taint attaches to its origins. 
Clark at 1099. See also Rest. 2d §82 (The essence of ratification 
is that the prior unauthorized act is treated as if it has been 
authorized by the principal from the outset) ; and Rest. 2d §93 
(Ratification results whenever the principal accepts the benefits 
or otherwise affirms the conduct of one purporting to act on the 
principal's behalf) (Emphasis added). Express approval of a 
transaction is the clearest evidence of ratification, but consent 
can also be found wherever the principal accepts the benefits of 
the transaction, as when the principal accepts the proceeds from a 
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sales transaction. By accepting the proceeds from the sale of an 
insurance policy, Plaintiff accepted the benefits and ratified the 
transaction carried out by its agent, Mr. England. 
Other authorities on agency have stated: "In accordance with 
general principles of agency, the insurer is ordinarily bound by 
the representations made by its soliciting agents as to the rate of 
premium." 5 Couch on Insurance 2d, Premiums, Assessments, Due § 
30:13 (1984). In this case Plaintiff's agent made a representation 
that the annual premium would be $2,140.00. Based upon this dollar 
figure the parties entered into a contractual relationship. 
Plaintiff asked the lower court to impose an additional $2,789.00 
(pro rated) burden upon the Defendants. The disparity between the 
estimate and the new alleged premiums is not a mere adjustment, but 
is a complete rewriting of the contract. Defendants were not 
provided with an opportunity to consent to such a huge distortion 
of the original agreement. 
While Plaintiff may claim the estimated premium stated on the 
Prematic application and agreement to have been a simple mistake, 
"[t]he responsibility for a mistake in the compilation of an 
insurance premium, not due to a misrepresentation of an insured, is 
upon the insurer, when the insured is not made aware of the mistake 
until a claim on the insurance policy is made." Anderson v. 
Dairvland Ins. Co. , 97 N.M. 155, 637 P.2d 837 (1981). Although no 
claim was made on the policy in question, Defendants were not 
notified of the disparity. Rather, the policy was simply 
cancelled. (R. at 255). 
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Where a premium finance company is not aware that an estimate 
is anything other than a reliable estimate, an agent binds the 
insurance company by his or her representations. Allston Finance 
Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co.. 18 Mass. App. 96, 463 N.E.2d 562 (1984). 
Accordingly, since the estimate given the Defendants was admittedly 
a valid estimate (R. at 392), Plaintiff is bound by the fact that 
Prematic is also bound pursuant to its finance agreement with 
Defendants. 
Surely at the time Plaintiff received the application and the 
premium payments Plaintiff was aware of the amount Defendants had 
paid. If there was something amiss with the premium amounts, 
certainly Plaintiff would have sounded the war cry at that time. 
It is apparent the only reason Plaintiff is now complaining that it 
is not bound by its agent's actions is to avoid a malicious 
prosecution action by Defendants. 
2. PLAINTIFF IS BOUND BY THE PREMATIC APPLICATION AND 
AGREEMENT 
As stated above, the Prematic application and agreement 
executed on November 30, 1984, expressly states in the last 
paragraph that the application is presumed accepted if no notice of 
rejection is received by Defendants within thirty (30) days from 
the date signed. The application was signed November 30, 1984 and 
the notice of rejection was given January 22, 1985, fifty-two (52) 
days after the application was signed. Since more than thirty (30) 
days had passed before rejection was received, Plaintiff is bound 
by the figure used in the application. 
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Plaintiff argued in the lower court that paragraph 4 of the 
Prematic application and agreement provides authorization to adjust 
the monthly premium deposit collected in the event of changes in 
coverage or rates ordered either by the customer or the insurance 
company. (R. at 392). 
This particular clause of the application and agreement cannot 
be employed as attempted by Plaintiff. Plaintiff has never argued 
that a change of "coverage or rates" ever occurred in regard to the 
period of time between November 30, 1984 and February 6, 1985, the 
time during which Defendants were covered by the first insurance 
policy. Rather, Plaintiff's argument was that the rate was higher 
to begin with. The clause was obviously intended to provide 
flexibility over the course of the contractual relationship of the 
parties; it was not intended to allow Plaintiff to adjust the 
estimates of its agents by any amount it wishes. 
II. DEPENDANTS OWE NOTHING UNDER THE SECOND INSURANCE POLICY. 
DEPENDANTS OWE NOTHING UNDER THE SECOND 
INSURANCE POLICY BECAUSE IT WAS EXECUTED BY 
SOMEONE OTHER THAN DEFENDANTS WITHOUT 
DEFENDANTS' AUTHORITY. 
The insurance policy on which Plaintiff based its complaint 
and first summary judgment motion was, as acknowledged by 
Plaintiff, the second policy. (R. at 5, R. at 231) . As stated by 
Plaintiff in it's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment: "TIE 
contends that the insurance coverage for which an earned premium is 
due is related to Application No. 2, received by TIE at its 
Pocatello Regional Office on or about January 18, 1985, . . . " 
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Defendants had no knowledge whatsoever of the second insurance 
policy. In approximately September 1990, Plaintiff, for the first 
time, presented Defendants with the second policy. This second 
policy was allegedly executed on the exact date and time as the 
first policy, and is allegedly signed by Defendant Betty Olcott 
(the first policy was signed by Defendant John Olcott). The 
signature on the second policy, however, was examined by a 
handwriting expert, a Mr. Glade M. Terry, who determined that the 
signature on the second policy was not signed by Defendant Betty 
Olcott. (R. at 290, See also 330) 
The Affidavit of Brad Chilton, an agent of Plaintiff, states 
that after Mr. England, the insurance agent, had been notified that 
the first insurance policy was cancelled, Plaintiff received a 
second application, the application which is the basis of this law 
suit. (R. at 237) . Interestingly, this second application was 
allegedly executed on the exact date and time as the first one; 
furthermore, it was allegedly signed by a different person than the 
one who signed the first application. Plaintiff would have the 
court believe that Defendants filled out two different applications 
for insurance at the exact same time and each of the Defendants 
signed one application: that John Olcott signed the first 
application, and Betty Olcott signed the second application. 
However, this is not supported by the facts. Defendants had 
never seen the second application, let alone signed it. Defendants 
first became aware of the existence of the second application when 
it was produced in 1990. Defendant Betty Olcott's assertion that 
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she did not sign the second application is supported by the 
affidavit of Terry Glade, a handwriting expert, who stated that the 
signature on the second application is inconsistent with writing 
samples provided by Defendant Betty Olcott. 
III. THE LOWER COURT'S RULING ON THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION AT 
ISSUE HERE CLEARLY INDICATES THE COURT'S LACK OF UNDERSTANDING 
OP THE ISSUES OP THIS CASE IN GENERAL, AND SPECIFICALLY THE 
ISSUES CONTAINED IN THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION BEFORE THE 
COURT 
The summary judgment motion at issue here clearly requests 
judgment based on the first insurance policy, which has never been 
pleaded. The first problem with the court's ruling is that it 
held, in paragraph two of said ruling: 
Defendants were notified by plaintiffs underwriting 
department that the risk could not be written in the 
particular subsidiary company at the rate indicated at 
the time of binding, but that the risk could be written 
in a higher risk company at a higher rate, and proceeded 
to issue a policy in that company at that rate. 
(R. at 512). This holding, however, is contradicted by the 
cancellation document sent to Defendants, dated January 22, 1985. 
Said cancellation document contains the following language: 
As you know, each Insurance Company has its own 
eligibility rules which govern the type of risk it 
insures. This means that an individual may be eligible 
for insurance in one company but not necessarily in 
another. 
A review of your insurance has shown that it does not 
conform with our present rules. Therefore, your 
insurance is cancelled effective * * * [2-6-85]. 
* * * 
Undoubtedly you will wish to place your insurance 
coverage elsewhere so this notice should allow you 
sufficient time to do so before your coverage terminates 
with the Exchange or Company on [2-6-85] 
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The court's ruling was inaccurate. Plaintiff informed Defendants, 
via the above-mentioned cancellation document, that their insurance 
was being cancelled and that they should procure insurance 
elsewhere. The notice did not state that it would proceed to 
insure Defendants in a different company. 
However, the clearest illustration of the lower court's lack 
of understanding of this case is found in paragraph five (5) of its 
ruling: 
The plaintiff is now seeking the unpaid portion of the 
insurance premium that they claim is owed. In doing so 
they have billed at the lower rate of the first, lower 
risk company. That amount is $2,315.39, and appears 
uncontested as to the amount, but contested as to whether 
or not it is owed. This is the subject matter of this 
suit and motion for summary judgment. 
(R. at 512). As has been extensively outlined previously, the 
first insurance application (policy) is not, in fact, the subject 
matter of this suit, as evidenced by Plaintiff's complaint and 
first summary judgment motion. Rather, it is the second insurance 
application which is the subject matter of this suit, as pled in 
Plaintiff's complaint. Additionally, the amount Plaintiff is 
claiming is owed on the first insurance policy is not $2,315.39, 
but $394.12. 
Plaintiff submitted to Defendants a draft of an Order 
purporting to comply with the court's ruling. Plaintiff's draft, 
however, differed in significant aspects with the court's ruling. 
In contrast to the lower court's holding, Plaintiff included the 
following in its draft: 
1. The earned premium which plaintiff seeks to recover; 
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2. is based on its lower or preferred rates; 
3. and amounts to $367.21: 
4. the evidence of the calculation of the amount of the 
unpaid earned premium is unrefuted and unopposed. (R. at 548). 
The discrepancies were both carefully drafted and subtle. 
There was no mention in the court's ruling of earned premium, but 
only of unpaid portions of premiums. Significantly, the court 
specified the $2,315.39 amount was the lower rate of the first, 
lower risk company, while the Order "massages" that into a lower, 
preferred rate leaving the company affiliation ambiguous. 
Additionally, the lower court held that the $2,315.39 is 
uncontested as to amount while the Order stated the unearned 
premium is unrefuted and unopposed. Also, the court specified in 
its ruling that no attorney's fees are awarded, while the drafted 
Order did not so inform. The Order should have specifically 
reflected the court's ruling. 
This Court should bear in mind that Plaintiff's motive is to 
avoid exposure to a malicious prosecution suit which Defendants 
intend to pursue. 
Defendants objected to the Order as drafted by Plaintiff, but 
the lower court, in a document ambiguously titled "Memorandum," 
stated: 
While the Court's discussion of its decision in behalf of 
plaintiff might not have been the most articulate, 
nevertheless the Court is still convinced that plaintiff 
has a right to judgment for the amount of premium earned 
and the other matters raised by defendant do not go to a 
defense of the plaintiffs' [sic] underlying claim. 
Therefore, the decision stands and plaintiff's Summary 
Judgment and Order Denying New Trial, which I believe I 
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ruled on once before are signed and the matter is closed 
at this trial level. 
(R. at 555). The lower court's affirmation of it's decision did 
not state that the amount found in it's ruling ($2,315.39) was 
incorrect. Therefore, Plaintiff's Order, which changed that amount 
to $394.21, was clearly inconsistent with the court's actual 
ruling. 
All of the above simply shows that the lower court was not 
sufficiently informed as to the issues in this ccise. Specifically, 
the court was not sufficiently informed on the issues contained in 
the summary judgment motion, which is the basis of this appeal, to 
make a correct ruling. 
The correct ruling in this case would have been that there are 
sufficient genuine issues of material fact which preclude summary 
judgment in Plaintiff's favor. To sum up the issues, they are as 
follows: 
1. Defendants executed an insurance application on November 
30, 1984, and paid the premiums applicable thereto. 
2. Plaintiff cancelled that insurance policy due to 
Defendants' ineligibility. 
3. Defendants then procured insurance elsewhere. 
4. Thereafter, a second insurance application, which is 
allegedly signed on the exact date and time as the first one, 
mysteriously shows up at Plaintiff's offices in Idaho. 
5. That second application, though containing the alleged 
signature of Betty Olcott, is, in fact, not hers, as evidenced by 
the affidavit of a handwriting expert. 
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6. Plaintiff made demands upon Defendants for payments on 
the second application, but Defendants refused to pay, not being 
aware that there was a second insurance application. 
7. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint based on that 
second insurance application, demanding the amount of $2,315.39. 
8. Plaintiff filed a summary judgment motion based on its 
complaint and the second insurance application, but that motion was 
denied. 
9. Plaintiff, in desperation to avoid eventual liability for 
malicious prosecution, filed a second summary judgment motion based 
on the first insurance policy. Prior to filing the second motion 
for summary judgment no claim or demand had ever been made for 
additional premiums on the first policy. 
The trial court failed to educate itself sufficiently of these 
issues, and erroneously granted summary judgment for Plaintiff. 
IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE GRANTED ONLY WHEN THERE EXISTS NO 
GENUINE ISSUE OP MATERIAL PACT AND THE MOVING PARTY IS 
ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OP LAW. 
Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of 
material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power 
and Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24 (Utah 1990). "All doubts, 
uncertainties, or inferences concerning issues of fact are to be 
construed in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary 
judgment." Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkins, Wright & 
Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984). Where there is 
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no dispute as to any material fact, the moving party must still be 
entitled to a judgment based upon the law. Id. In this case, not 
only are there disputed material facts, but the law does not favor 
Plaintiff. Therefore, summary judgment for Plaintiff was 
erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
This appeal is the result of simple and clear misunderstanding 
by the lower court of the issues before it. The summary judgment 
must therefore be reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of September, 1993. 
/^Attorney \£ 
.NEJT, P.C. 
fendant 
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FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
FARMER'S INSURANCE GROUP, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN OLCOTT AND BETTY OLCOTT 
dba JB'S PEPPER TREE MARKET, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM 
Case # 920002639 CV 
The Court has received plaintiff's Summary Judgment and Order 
Denying New Trial and has received defendant's Notice Of 
Objection To Summary Judgment. 
While the Court's discussion of its decision in behalf of 
plaintiff might not have been the most articulate, nevertheless 
the Court is still convinced that plaintiff has a right to 
judgment for the amount of premium earned and the other matters 
raised by defendant do not go to a defense of the plaintiffs' 
underlying claim. Therefore, the decision stands and plaintiff's 
Summary Judgment and Order Denying New Trial, which I believe I 
ruled on once before are signed and the matter is closed at this 
trial level. 
March 25, 1993 
Circuit Court Ju 
I certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing Notice of 
Setting were hand delivered, X mailed postage prepaid, on the 
31st day of March, 1993 to the following interested parties: 
Thomas J Scribner, 2696 N University Ave., Suite 220, Provo, UT 
84604 
Harold C Verhaaren, 60 East South Temple, 11th Floor, Salt Lake 
City, UT 84111 
y 
Deputy Court Clerk 
WAYNE B. WATSON, P.C. - 3405 
THOMAS J. SCRIBNER, P.C. - 4910 
WATSON & SCRIBNER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
2696 N. University Ave., Suite 220 
Provo, UT 84 604 
Telephone: (801) 375-5600 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
FARMER'S INSURANCE GROUP, : NOTICE OF OBJECTION 
TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Pla in t i f f , : 
vs. : 
JOHN OLCOTT AND BETTY OLCOTT : 
dba JBfS PEPPER TREE MARKET, 
Civil No. 9202639 
Defendant. : Judge McGuire 
COME NOW Defendants, by and through their attorneys of record, and 
objects to plaintiff's pleading entitled Summary Judgment, based on 
Rules of Judicial Administration §4-504, as follows: 
A. Paragraph 5 of plaintiff's pleading is not consistant with the 
ruling of the court. The court holds in its paragraph "Five" several 
holdings: 
1. plaintiff is now seeking the unpaid portion of the 
insurance premium they claim is owed; 
2. In doing so they have billed at the lower rate of the 
first, lower risk company; 
3. That amount is $2,315.39; 
4. That amount appears uncontested as to the amount but 
contested as to whether it is owed, 
5. This is the subject matter of this suit and motion for 
summary judgment. 
In contrast to this holding, plaintiff drafts the following in its 
order: 
1. The earned premium which plaintiff seeks to recover; 
2. is based on its lower or preferred rates; 
3. and amounts to $367.21; 
4. the evidence of the calculation of the amount of the 
unpaid earned premium is unrefuted and unopposed. 
The descrepancies above are both carefully drafted and subtle. 
While it is obvious that plaintiff is attempting to correct the error 
of the court in awarding $2,315.39 instead of the requested $367.21, 
this court has determined to uphold its prior decision. Accordingly, 
the proper amount of the judgment should be $2,315.39, as directed by 
the court in its ruling dated January 11, 1993. Likewise, there is no 
mention of earned premium in the courts ruling, only of unpaid portions 
of premiums. Significantly, the court specified the $2,315.39 amount 
was the lower rate of the first, lower risk company, while the order 
massages that into a lower, preferred rate leaving the company 
affiliation ambiguous. Finally, the court holds the $2,315.39 is 
uncontested as to amount while the order states the unearned premium is 
unrefuted and unopposed. Defendants believe the order should 
specifically reflect the ruling of the court and demand the summary 
judgment be drafted accordingly. 
B. Further, the court specifies no attorney's fees are awarded 
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while the drafted order does not so inform. 
WHEREFORE, defendants pray this court cause the summary judgment 
drafted by plaintiff be changed to correctly reflect the ruling of this 
court. _ 
day of JfHZu^C^ 1993. DATED this 
RIBtfER, P.C. 
CTSON & ^ CRIBNER 
attorneys for Defendant 
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HAROLD C. VERHAAREN - 3325 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
oooOooo 
TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, : 
: SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
: Case No. CV 9202639 
JOHN OLCOTT and BETTY OLCOTT, : Judge E. Patrick McGuire 
dba JB'S PEPPER TREE MARKET, : 
Defendants. : 
oooOooo 
The Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment dated 
December 11, 1991, came on regularly for hearing on December 8, 
1992, before the Honorable E. Patrick McGuire, one of the judges of 
the above-entitled court. Harold C. Verhaaren of Nielsen & Senior 
appeared for the Plaintiff and Wayne B. Watson of Watson & Scribner 
appeared for the Defendants. The Court heard the argument of the 
parties' respective counsel and based upon its review of the file, 
as a whole, including the motion, memoranda and affidavits, issued 
its written ruling dated January 11, 1993, that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the Plaintiff is entitled to 
judgment against the Defendants as a matter of law. The Court 
finds that: 
1. The Defendants applied for and received commercial 
insurance coverage from the Plaintiff based upon the Defendants• 
application for insurance coverage. Applications for commercial 
insurance coverage, such as the application received by the 
Plaintiff from the Defendants, do not specify rates or premium 
computations when submitted by the writing agents# but are reviewed 
by the underwriting departments to evaluate the acceptability of 
the risk and to determine the rate at which insurance coverage will 
be provided. 
2. The Defendants were notified by the Plaintiff's 
underwriting department that the risk could not be written by the 
Plaintiff at the preferred rate estimated at the time that 
insurance coverage was bound, but that the risk could be written in 
an affiliated higher risk company, Farmers Insurance Exchange, at 
a higher premium and proceeded to issue a policy in that company at 
that rate. 
3. The Defendants then obtained insurance coverage from 
another insurance carrier at a rate more satisfactory to them. 
4. The Defendants were provided insurance coverage by 
the Plaintiff during the period of communication, i.e. from the 
date of their application for coverage until they obtained 
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insurance coverage from another insurance carrier. For that 
period, a premium was earned by the Plaintiff. 
5. The earned premium which the Plaintiff now seeks to 
recover is based upon its lower or preferred rates and amounts to 
Three Hundred Sixty Seven Dollars and Twenty One Cents ($367.21). 
The evidence of the calculation of the amount of the unpaid earned 
premium at the lower rate is unrefuted and unopposed. 
The Court, therefore, Orders that the Plaintiff is 
awarded judgment against the Defendants in the principal sum of 
Three Hundred Sixty Seven Dollars and Twenty One Cents ($367.21) 
and costs of court of Twenty Seven Dollars ($27.00), aggregating 
Three Hundred Ninety-Four Dollars and Twenty-One Cents ($394.21) 
together with interest thereon at the rate of twelve percent (12%) 
per annum until paid in full. 
DATED this day of , 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE E. PATRICK MCGUIRE 
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FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
JOHN OLCOTT AND BETTY OLCOTT, 
Defendant. 
R U L I N G 
CASE# 920002639 CV 
This matter came on for hearing on the motion of plaintiff for 
summary judgment by way of motion, affidavit and request for oral 
arguments. In addition the court had the counter affidavit of 
defendant. The oral arguments were heard and based upon the file 
as a whole, including the motion, affidavits, and oral argument, 
the Court finds and rules as follows: 
One: Defendants entered into a commercial coverage insurance 
policy with plaintiffs, which policies are reviewed by their 
underwriting department for applicabilty to the risk and the rate 
which is not determined up front as an auto or homeowners policy 
would be due to the nature of the risk and its need for 
underwriting analysis. 
Two: Defendants were notified by plaintiffs' underwriting 
department that the risk could not be written in the particular 
subsidiary company at the rate indicated at the time of binding, 
but that the risk could be written in a higher risk company at a 
higher rate, and proceeded to issue a policy in that company at 
that rate. 
Three: Defendants were covered by the plaintiff insurer during 
this period of communication and a premium was earned by plaintiff, 
Four: Defendants obtained insurance coverage from another 
insurance carrier at a rate more satisfactory to them. 
Five: The plaintiff is now seeking the unpaid portion of the 
insurance premium that they claim is owed. In doing so they have 
billed at the lower rate of the first, lower risk company. That 
amount is $2,315.39, and appears uncontested as to the amount, but 
contested as to whether or not is it owed. This is the subject 
matter of this suit and motion for summary judgment. 
The Court rules that the plaintiff has met its burden in its 
motion and that there are no material issues of fact as to the 
motion for summary judgment. There were peripheral issues and 
questions raised but these went more to the counterclaim which was 
dismissed. 
Having so found and ruled the Court instructs counsel to prepare 
the appropriate papers for signature. No attorney fees are 
awarded. Court costs are awarded. 
DATED: January 11, 199 3 
. ^ • ' / * -f • 
Circu i t Court Jiigtge 
I do hereby certify that copies of the foregoing RULING were 
mailed, postage prepaid, on this 11th day of January, 1993 to the 
following parties. 
Thomas J Scribner, 2696 N University Avenue, Suite 220, Provo, UT 
84604 
Harold C Verhaaren, 60 East South Temple, 11th Floor, Salt Lake 
City, UT 84111 
Davi Coombs 
Circuit Court Clerk 
-P: 2 2 
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
FARMER'S INSURANCE GROUP, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN OLCOTT AND BETTY OLCOTT 
dba JB'S PEPPER TREE MARKET, 
Defendants. 
RULING 
Case # 920002639 CV 
The Court has reviewed the matter argued on December 8, 1992 and 
reaffirms its ruling. Defendant's Motion for New Trial is denied. 
February 19, 1993 f~\ 
Circuit Court Ji/oge 
I certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing Notice of 
Setting were hand delivered, X mailed postage prepaid, on the 
"iQf-Vi r\zz^r
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Thomas J Scribner, 2696 North University Ave., Suite 220, Provo, 
UT 84604 
Harold C Verhaaren, 60 East South Temple, 11th Floor, Salt Lake 
City, UT 84111 
Deputy Court Clerk 
This notice ^rrv **d 
is issued by &2S The Exchange or Company desigr 
n ^ 
- - ^ " A slock insurance company h«r«tn colled the Company 
not;" 1 - 2 2 - 8 5 
Loan 
Number 
Property 
Location 
INFORMATION FOR MORTGAGEE ONLY 
(If different from insured s oddrew shown below) 
C»ry and Slate 
insured .JOHN S BETTY OLCOTT 
•DBA: JB'S PEPPER TREE MARKET 
•135 EAST 800 NORTH 
OREM UT 8^057 
* If mortgage* pay* premiur 
refund hat been mailed to th 
mortgagee (except In Kansas 
where refund has been mail* 
to the insured). 
POLICY OR APPLICATION NUMBER 
6572 64 73 
AGENT S NUMBER 
76 09 170 
CANCELLATION DATE 
2-6-85 
REFUND OR AMOUNT DUE 
(IF ANY) SEE BELOW 
* 
As you know, each Insurance Company has its own eligibility rules which govern the type o 
risk it insures. This means that an individual may be eligible for insurance in one company 
but not necessarily in another. 
A review of your insurance has shown that it does not conform with our present rules 
Therefore, your insurance is cancelled effective at 12:00 NOON (12:01 A.M. in California 
Oregon, Texas and fire policies in Arkansas, Washington and Idaho) on the cancellatior 
date shown. 
D A m o u n t due reflects any unpaid premium for the time your policy was n 
force. 
D Refund attached reflects any excess premium due you because of thi 
cancellation. 
Undoubtedly you wi l l wish to place your insurance coverage elsewhere so this notice shoulc 
al low you sufficient time to do so before your coverage terminates with the Exchange o 
Company on the date indicated. 
IMPORTANT NOTICE TO KANSAS POLICYHOLDERS (Applicable only to automobile insurance cancellations) Finan 
cial security for every motor vehicle covered by the policy is required to be maintained continuously throughout fh 
registration period The operation of any such motor vehicle without maintaining continuous financial securit 
therefor is a class B misdemeanor and the registration for any such motor vehicle for which continuous financic 
security is pot provided is subject to suspension and the driver's license of the owner thereof is subject to suspensior 
Mortgagee , • * - , « , 
or Other . ^ ~x & w 
Interest . . D E S E R E T * 
•99 WEST 
"
,J
- -LEHI TJT 
yi if. » j ia 
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